In Australia, the Aviation Regulatory Reform Plan (RRP) grinds on – on my calculation, the process of writing new aviation rules has taken about 20 years and who knows, how much money.
It has been the subject of considerable industry consultation and angst; and it is something which many politicians and industry observers are concerned about. I guess we can understand the challenges and construction of the pyramids a little better as a result of living with this process!
I've always said that the rule writing challenge will pale into insignificance when one considers the implementation task, and its impact on the aviation industry. Whoever has this regulatory role has a very important task indeed.
In some ways, the slow rule writing process and drip feed of new rules made has and will mask the impact on the industry and the regulator. Had they been made all together or as collective groups, the impact would have been far more obvious.
I was interested to read an article in the Aviatime Aviation News website about the US FAA challenges in implementing the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010. A key element of the Act is to raise pilot training and performance standards as well as advancing voluntary programs that yield critical safety information.
A report by the US Office of Inspector General (DOT) has reviewed the FAA performance and found that they have made considerable progress in the implementation activity, but also found that they have not sufficiently assisted smaller air operators who often find difficulty with, and are slow in making any changes required to comply with new rules.
In Australia, the industry and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) have many years of implementation activity ahead of them. Already, and predictably, some smaller operators have decided that it is a good time to hang up the helmet and goggles, as the effort and cost of implementation is either now upon them or looms in the near future. As a result, I expect some unintended structural reform of the industry, particularly in the non-air transport sector (general aviation using the Australian term) to take place.
For the businesses who decide to stay in the industry; there is a reasonable expectation that CASA will honor its long held commitment to industry to assist in meaningful ways. Each operator or organization must have a helpful assigned Inspector who will act as an account manager. This person will need special project management and communications training. One of these people’s and CASA's key performance measures must be based upon the success of an implementation activity. I mean results; operators and an industry properly transitioned to the new rule set! Hard results; not soft measures!
CAR 219 (click here to view the regulation), is applicable to charter operations. It says inter alia, that the pilot in command must be qualified for a flight over a particular route being flown. The regulation prescribes the items for which a pilot shall have adequate knowledge to be qualified. The operator grants the qualification after some instruction or test to prove the pilot is competent.
This regulation was designed to ensure that an operator does not launch some poor hapless kid or new pilot on a complex flight without some knowledge about what he or she is likely to encounter. It is a way of treating the risk, and to the best of my knowledge, all jurisdictions have similar rules because it is a sensible precaution to take.
Section 28BE(1) of the Civil Aviation Act (click here to view the Act), states, “The holder of an AOC must at all times take all reasonable steps to ensure that every activity covered by the AOC, and everything done in connection with such an activity, is done with a reasonable degree of care and diligence.” This is a provision which conforms to social demands for an operator to do what is required to ensure a safe workplace and the protection of innocent third parties.
This provision of the Act does not differentiate between categories of operations, because it satisfies a higher social demand.
The CAR 219 applicability to charter is very out-dated and almost irrelevant when you note s28BE of the Act.
In my experience, CAR 219 is not well understood and I’d guess that many AOC holders do not even know it exists. Some use the aerial work classification erroneously, because CAR 206 is also generally misunderstood, and the definitions of aerial work are shrouded in weak legal precedence and therefore operators choose not to apply CAR 219.
Regardless, of the classification, regulation 219 should be used to satisfy s28BE of the Act in the case of rostering a pilot to fly over a new or unfamiliar route. When I conduct AOC audits or safety assessments, I often ask operators to prove that pilot blogs was qualified for the charter he did last night. I almost invariably get blank looks!
“Regulators must provide quality services, efficiently and in a timely manner.” This has been my mantra for at least 13 years. It’s very well documented and I’m occasionally reminded of it from my industry friends.
The system of civil aviation safety is poorly understood and very complex. There are many components which rely upon each other to ensure efficient and safe aviation services to consumers. Aviation regulators are a key component, if for no other reason than that of their statutory functions; Make and maintain rules and standards, control entry, conduct comprehensive and hopefully scientific industry surveillance, provide safety promotion and education, and last but not least, conduct enforcement activities.
Poor service (whether a function of quality or time), can have a subtle or significant impact on the system of aviation safety. It also has a big impact on the industry’s ability to avail themselves of commercial opportunities.
The service equation is muddied by the ability of the regulator to charge a fee for the service. In Australia, the fee must be a fee based upon recovering costs; in other words the model is not profit based. Other regional regulators do not have this restriction and can set their fees at will.
A cost recovery model is not easy to administer, because regular reviews of costs must be conducted to a standard which will withstand external scrutiny. The regulators resource effort to review all costs is significant but not a wasted exercise. It provides a useful snapshot for politicians, industry leaders and the regulator’s management of the regulator’s efficiency.
When service fees were increased in 2004, CASA was required to review all costs, and a number of minor and major changes resulted from identifying non-safety related or low risk activities which could be modified or culled. This also resulted in service efficiency and effectiveness changes which reduced time taken and in some cases costs to industry. Most industry people canvassed then and now emphatically state that the cost is important but is secondary to time taken to have the service completed.
Providing effective and efficient service is a bit like a marriage; you have to keep working on it! People are funny cattle and management of aviation regulators must take control to prevent inventions of process which add no value or do not address a safety risk.
“Regulators must provide quality services, efficiently and in a timely manner.” This has been my mantra for at least 12 years. It’s very well documented and I’m occasionally reminded of it from my industry friends.
The system of civil aviation safety is poorly understood and very complex. There are many components which rely upon each other to ensure efficient and safe aviation services to consumers. Aviation regulators are a key component, if for no other reason than that of their statutory functions; Make and maintain rules and standards, control entry, conduct comprehensive and hopefully scientific industry surveillance, provide safety promotion and education, and last but not least, conduct enforcement activities.
Poor service (whether a function of quality or time), can have a subtle or significant impact on the system of aviation safety. It also has a big impact on the industry’s ability to avail themselves of commercial opportunities.
The service equation is muddied by the ability of the regulator to charge a fee for the service. In Australia, the fee must be a fee based upon recovering costs; in other words the model is not profit based. Other regional regulators do not have this restriction and can set their fees at will.
A cost recovery model is not easy to administer, because regular reviews of costs must be conducted to a standard which will withstand external scrutiny. The regulators resource effort to review all costs is significant but not a wasted exercise. It provides a useful snapshot for politicians, industry leaders and the regulator’s management of the regulator’s efficiency.
When service fees were increased in 2004, CASA was required to review all costs, and a number of minor and major changes resulted from identifying non-safety related or low risk activities which could be modified or culled. This also resulted in service efficiency and effectiveness changes which reduced time taken and in some cases costs to industry. Most industry people canvassed then and now emphatically state that the cost is important but is secondary to time taken to have the service completed.
Providing effective and efficient service is a bit like a marriage; you have to keep working on it! People are funny cattle and management of aviation regulators must take control to prevent inventions of process which add no value or do not address a safety risk.
My regulatory career commenced in 1990, and was one punctuated by a sensible focus on the law. After all, regulators are only established by virtue of an Act of Parliament which subsequently makes other regulations or rules for them to regulate against.
Prior to 1992, the Australian aviation regulator (the then Civil Aviation Authority) apparently applied liberal discretion and sometimes self-imposed requirements on industry, which were not subject to external scrutiny, not necessarily addressing a risk, often discriminatory and open to accusations of abuse of power or privilege. The then Director of Civil Aviation Safety, Mr Ron Cooper completely changed the culture and this lasted for about 15 years or so. This was quite an achievement!
Regulators could not apply their own interpretations or biases to a situation and although industry did not always like the enforcement of a rule, they at least had some assurance that a sort of, level playing field existed, and they had legal recourse. Rules could also be amended through a proper and transparent process.
In my time as a CASA Executive Manager, significant policies which are not law but nevertheless could affect industry were also subject to consultation – predominantly with the peak industry bodies.
What happened?
Occasionally, in recent years, I have had cause to respectfully ask inspectors, “show me in the regulations where it says that.” Sometimes they can show me and that’s good. I’ve learnt something.
Other times, I've noted that there is no regulatory basis for a ‘requirement’ imposed by an inspector. I assume this is a feature of their training and experience, so I never take these things personally and do my best to be courteous and respectful. If there is no regulatory basis however, I expect him or her, also to respectfully acknowledge that I am correct and we can both get on and undertake our business.
All regulatory authorities are prone to what I call, interpretation creep; this insidious malaise can only be identified by a sensible communication with industry, managers knowing the industry and the regulation business and properly managing their people.
The global aviation industry still grapples with the difficult issue of managing aviation crew fatigue risk.
Australia has been trialling various regulatory options since 1989 and now has a concrete proposed new rule available for industry comment. Australia has had basic flight and duty time limitation rules since I started flying in 1974 – and those in the Civil Aviation Order 48 are still the same rules. The FAA, the Indian Aviation Regulator and EASA have also revised or made new rules to address the fatigue risk to safe aviation.
The proposals should be well developed because in Australia for example, scientific studies have been ongoing for years having produced good results. Similar studies have also been conducted in other countries and much information has been shared to the credit of the global aviation community. However; the layman may reasonably ask, about the length of time taken for aviation regulators to address this issue; especially when there is a proven nexus between some accidents and fatigue.
There are many issues associated with sophisticated rules to address aviation fatigue, and they are complex. A few that come readily to mind are as follows.
First; there is a general appreciation that every human being is different and has different tolerances to fatigue. For example; I can fly all night for months on the east coast of Australia without appreciable fatigue because, I can sleep during the day, whereas, I had considerable difficulty when I was an international long haul airline pilot flying trans meridian routes. Second; there are complex physiological issues associated with short term fatigue and the insidious chronic fatigue condition. Third; every aviation operation is different and requires different skills and thinking to accomplish safely. Fourth; all operators need to remain profitable and internationally competitive.
Whilst comprehensive rules based on science may attempt to address all of the issues I’ve identified, it is very likely that the human problem is difficult to completely solve. For examples; most of us have been tired and decided to continue doing something because we thought we were OK! Most of us have a predisposition to ‘do the right thing’ and get the job done. Most of us do not recognise chronic fatigue in ourselves!
As discussed in other BLOGS, rules in and of themselves are not the complete answer. Indeed, the rules should be the minimum standards. New or revised rules about fatigue must be stapled with SMS for all operators so that the residual potential human element risks can be treated in the operator’s business.
Operators must have effective Safety Management Systems (SMS) and a sound reporting culture to capture the human induced risks and efficacious management systems to treat these risks. The SMS safety promotion and education informed by the analysis of crew reports must also raise awareness of fatigue risks within a company.
See my book, “Safety Management without the Mumbo Jumbo” for more about safety management systems. It is available in paperback and E-Book from Palmer Higgs at www.palmerhiggsbooks.com.au/index.php or in E-Book format only from AMAZON at www.amazon.com .
As a former Aviation Safety Regulator Executive, I was often asked the difficult question about the value of the safety regulator. This is difficult because there is little likelihood that the regulatory agency would be abolished in order to measure what safety value it added.
This question is particularly complex when you consider the functions of the aviation safety regulator which are usually, to set rules and standards, control entry into the aviation community, conduct industry surveillance activities, undertake enforcement activities and promote aviation safety.
Faced with increasing cost pressures including those associated with safety regulation, my peak industry body friends would sometimes ask the question. By the way, I think the question in and of itself it a good and worthy one.
But let’s look at the question un-emotively:
If we look the question in the context of the regulator’s functions, we note that any community without rules is anarchic, and although the rules and standards may not be perfect they are more or less risk based. Without an entry control function, the industry would be awash with incapable dreamers and those who financially rip the guts out of it without adding any value. There would be no level playing field for industry participants. Without surveillance, over time those of lower capability and the less scrupulous would prosper and the rest would have to lower their standards accordingly. Without an enforcement capability, the regulator would have no teeth and the public no recourse for those who wilfully flaunt the rules. Finally, without a safety promotion capability, some industry participants would struggle with new things such as Safety Management Systems (SMS).
Interestingly, the regulators functions look very much like those found in SMS; establish procedures and standards, conduct internal audit to ensure that people are adhering to procedures and standards and appropriately managing risk, have a JUST (enforcement) policy, and promote and educate for safety.
I read an article recently about the safety performance of African airlines and how the performance has improved dramatically in countries where the Aviation Safety Regulator has also improved their capability and or, they are subject to oversight from bodies such as IATA or ISBAO.
The Aviation Safety Regulators are an important thread in the fabric of our society and their safety value and ability to meet social expectations is linked to their safety capability.
To read more about SMS and regulatory matters, see my book, “Safety Management without the Mumbo Jumbo”, available in hard copy and E-Book from the Palmer Higgs Bookstore, www.palmerhiggs.com.au or the E-Book from Amazon www.amazon.com .
Recently, Australia's CASA released a document "An Assessment of Trends and Risk Factors in Passenger Air Transport". This document is one of CASA's initiatives to identify risk and address it, thereby enhancing aviation safety. The notion of data gathering and analysis is not new and is contemplated in section 9(1)(g) of the Australian Civil Aviation Act, which obligates CASA to conduct regular reviews of the system of civil aviation safety. Indeed, similar exercises have been undertaken in the past, so in my opinion, this is a good second step in an eternal process; however I found the assessment a little superficial. I think that it could have been more comprehensive. Click here to read the report.
The US FAA established the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing intitiative (ASIAS) a few years ago with some success. Apparently, the keys to the success of this initiative are information sharing, analysis and trust. Clearly a high level of trust is required to enable useful information to be gathered and shared by the regulator and other relevant stakeholders (including global stakeholders). This requires a higher level of maturity on behalf of the regulator, industry and other stakeholders.
In a speech recently, the FAA Associate Administrator, Nick Sabatini stated inter alia, that the aviation community is on the threshold of reaching the next level in aviation safety, and the key to higher levels of safety is using safety data to identify remaining or previously undiscovered risk. Click here to read Mr. Sabatini's speech.
In the speech he gave an example of how data had been used to increase understanding and make a difference in aviation safety. Following an accident in August 2006 in Kentucky where an aircraft took off from the wrong runway, the ASIAS undertook a examination of 116 wrong runway departures over the past 20 years. In the study, they found that there were common physical characteristics that could lead to pilot confusion and result in a departure from the wrong runway. This is very powerful information.
Understandedly, many aviation safety initiatives have involved addressing some active failure in a system. For example, a wrong runway departure may be addressed by providing better familiarization training, documentation and signage for pilots; and once this is done, little more examination is undertaken to reveal latent failures in the system which may have also contributed to the incident.
In my opinion Mr. Sabatini has hit the nail on the head when he uses the phrase, "previously undiscovered risk.". Possibly, the low hanging safety fruit has been harvested, and the hard work is just starting. Industry and the regulator are now required to dig deeper to look for hitherto undiscovered active and latent failures. The latent failures are generally well hidden and some considerable trust, patience and energy is required to identify and address them.
Our challenge is to engender trust between industry and government agencies, encourage information sharing and find previously undiscovered aviation risk in all areas of the system of aviation safety.
As a former aviation safety regulator, I read with interest an article which appeared in Flight International magazine recently. Entitled, F
AA Oversight Role Slammed, the article outlined some of the issues facing the FAA as it evolves from being a forensic to a prognostic aviation safety agency.
FAA Associate Administrator, Nick Sabatini was quoted as saying that (inter alia), the days of randoming touching an airplane and hoping to find somthing are long gone; this was on the eve of a US congressional hearing called, "Critical Lapses in FAA's Safety oversight of Airlines". Apart for the usual change management issues, the problem appears to be the FAA's reliance with the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) which relies heavily, but not entirely upon voluntary reporting mechanisms by the airlines themselves.
Alegations of "cosy" realationships, and matters appropriately raised by FAA whistleblowers have fueled the current round of dissatisfaction with the oversight arrangements. The FAA have countered with a plan to address perceived deficiencies. Of interest, is a restriction that will prevent Inspectors being recruited to an airline which they are or were responsible for oversighting. Other initiatives include regular rotation of Supervisory Inspectors, the establishment of a national review team to look into safety issues raised by FAA staff, and periodic reviews of the FAA Oversight functions.
Having been involved in this type of change, I see many similarities in what has occurred in Australia over the past 15 years or so. I have come to realise that law makers like the concepts (often because it saves money - and most can see sense in a holistic and scientific oversight strategy), but quickly get nervous and may revert to a preference for a simplistic objective oversight approach preference when the going gets tough (something significant occurs).
All common sense, research and experience indicates that a safety oversight strategy which relies heavily or entirely on "touching the airplane" (commonly called product audit), is at best lucky to find significant issues before they become failures. Conversely, a sytem that relies entirely on a systems methodology is also not fully effective. A good system relies on both, competent Inspectors, an analytical capability, good management and sound governance.
The lawyers who prosecute or defend play a deft hand in assessing the role of the regulator; on one hand they are critical of simplistic and unscientific approaches, and on the other, are also critical of what may be characterized as an over-zealous regulatory approach. The perspective is often determined by the circumstances of their client.
Notwithstanding all of the above, often this sort of change is not well managed and goes too far too quickly, or implodes into an incompetent mess. I guess the system is working when someone identifies the problems and adjustments are made, so that eventually a better system is established.
The role of the safety regulator is not an easy one; there is no need to articulate the reasons for they are well known. Their role is more difficult when change is required, and someone has the fortitude to implement them.
